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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance concerns are old. Traces of the concept have been found in Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice and in Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations (Tricker (2005) ). In recent decades, particularly since the 90's, the study of corporate governance has seen an unprecedented impulse: it is, indeed, a subject in the news.
Scandals such as Enron's just gave further strength to an existing wave. 3 This paper is a primer on corporate governance, corporate performance and their relationships. Two of its characteristics can be pointed out: its emphasis on the literature related to the measurement of corporate governance and corporate performance; and its application of concepts to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs). Methods to measure performance and governance are critical if we are to understand how the two concepts are related.
The paper aims at systematizing existing knowledge on corporate governance, including contingency success factors and performance measures. The research review looks primarily at the "big questions" in the field, although questions that deserve attention are presented, even if they are not "big". Until recently, most studies on corporate governance were related to large enterprises, particularly publicly-owned firms. In the past few years, however, the interest in corporate governance has spread to smaller organizations (Gabrielsson (ca. 2004 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II is a preliminary, non systematic review on performance measurement. The trend from financial to non-financial measures is analyzed and a taxonomy of performance measures is presented, as well as the impact of the Total Quality Management (TQM) movement as a driver towards nonfinancial measures. Design and implementation of performance management systems is an important topic considered in this section. Finally, literature contributions to performance measurement at SMEs are briefly reviewed.
Section III is a short review of the literature on corporate governance. Governance as a general concept is presented, previous to the more specific concept of corporate governance. Four theories of corporate governance are explained: agency theory, stewardship theory, resource based theory, and stakeholder theory. Two important concepts close the section: corporate governance measurement and the application of corporate governance concepts to SMEs.
Section IV looks at the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance. Reference is made to both works on large firms and works on SMEs. Section V is a short conclusion.
II. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT, WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO

SMALL FIRMS
II.1 Performance evaluation: from financial to non-financial measures
The word performance will be used with a wider meaning than productivity. While productivity relates an operations' output to the inputs required to produce it, performance-as we understand it-measures, in addition to productivity, many other concepts, such as the degree to which the firm meets customer expectations, the quality of working life, and product quality. If productivity relates to efficiency (how well resources are being used), performance relates to effectiveness (how well customers demands are being met). Performance measurement is "the process of quantifying action, where measurement is the process of quantification and action leads to performance." A performance measurement system, in addition, is a set of metrics used to quantify action (Neely et al. (1995) ).
Several reasons account for the popularity reached by performance measurement in recent years. These include: the changing nature of work; increasing competition; specific improvement initiatives; national and international quality awards; changing organizational roles; changing external demands; and the power of information technology (Neely (1999) In order to be useful, a performance measurement system has to be in line with corporate policies and must be applied consistently to realize strategy. It has also to be multidimensional, in order to capture the many aspects of an enterprise, its products and services. Approaches such as the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton (1992) ) and the multiple dimensions of quality (Garvin (1988) ) were introduced to deal with the complexity of measuring efficiency and effectiveness.
II.2 Perspectives on performance measures
II.2.1 A taxonomy of performance measures
Given the great number of performance measures used through the years, some order in classification was called for. White (1996) proposes a taxonomy of strategy-related performance measures, reproduced in Table 1 . Classification of performance measures. Source: White (1996) . Table 1 can be used as a concept checklist to follow performance evolution through the history of an organization. A firm might detect that its evaluation of human resources performance is based on subjective data and that biased perceptions and opinions negatively affect company climate; the taxonomy then can remind the management that there are objective ways to conduct human resources evaluation. Likewise, a company could have been oriented to judge only the outcome of a production process but, faced with the need to improve product quality, the taxonomy suggests that controlling process inputs is equally possible and generally valuable.
II.2.2 TQM as a driver to non-financial measures
Total Quality Management (TQM) is a rich source of methods for performance measurement systems, which aim to evaluate the outcomes of overall corporate strategy.
Thus, there must be harmony between strategy and the measurement system. TQM measures exhibit three important characteristics which help to put in parallel day-to-day actions and long-term goals: (1) They measure productivity and quality from a customer's viewpoint; (2) they are operations oriented, rather than accounting control oriented; and (3) they are disaggregated and function specific (Wruck and Jensen (1998) The maximum assigned to leadership was reduced from 150 in 1999 to 110 in 2004.
Other minor changes can be detected when comparing points for these two years, including the following: the maximum number of points for economic-financial results was reduced from 90 to 80 while the corresponding figure for operational results was increased from 50 to 70. These modifications suggest, in our opinion, a trend change that gives more importance to operations measures at the expense of financial measures.
Notice that customer satisfaction is among the indicators considered by the Award, as it is a fundamental measure of a firm's performance. It is not enough that a company gets 5 The rest of this section is based on Yacuzzi (2005) , Fundación Premio Nacional a la Calidad (1999), and Fundación Premio Nacional a la Calidad (2004). 6 The Argentine award is very similar in general terms to other foreign awards, such as the Malcolm Balrige National Quality Award, USA. • Customer-focused organization
• Leadership
• Personnel participation
• Process-based approach
• Systems-based management
• Decision making based on facts
• Continuous improvement of processes
• Mutually beneficial relationship with suppliers.
A fundamental idea behind these systems is that "things that matter must be measured". If a company strategy highlights the importance of customer care, measures of how well the customer is being treated are key to the company. TQM people is fond of
saying: "what is not measured cannot be improved, and even if it is improved, there is no way to know it". Argentina's National Quality Award Basis indicate that, as part of each factor evaluation, the cycle of continuous improvement must be examined, inquiring in how processes are evaluated and improved.
In short, the quality movement has so far been the main driver of an expansion in the scope of performance measurement. Its compound metrics define measurement criteria in detail, and suggest that multiple measures, both financial and non-financial, are required.
It is necessary to examine corporate strategy and inquire into what measures (financial and non-financial) must be controlled in order to achieve good financial results, sustainable in time. Families of measures have been proposed that include, for example, product quality, cash flow, process innovation, return on investment, and production process efficiency. Table 2 . National Quality Award, Argentina. Table with Benchmarking. An important component of the quality movement is benchmarking, that is, "the comparison of processes and results that represent best practices and best performance for similar activities, be it in the same business sector to which the organization belongs to or in any other". 8 Comparison of processes and results is made through both financial and non-financial measures, the latter being the most important for continuous improvement. Benchmarking impact is in large part psychological, since directors and employees become conscious of process possibilities and therefore change attitudes. In addition, benchmarking allows organizations to set objectives on the basis of concrete data, rather than on intuition; it facilitates implementation of process improvements, and it increases consciousness about the benefits of new technologies. 9 Benchmarking assumes the following: (1) The firm knows its operational strengths and weaknesses; (2) the firm knows its competitors and industry leaders; and (3) the firm is decided to incorporate the best methods to gain superiority, by imitating and surpassing the strength of the industry leaders. 10 These assumptions make mandatory the design and use of a solid performance measurement system.
II.3 Performance measurement systems: design and implementation
There are systematic ways to design a performance measurement system. Implementation of a complex measurement system is not immediate. In many organizations there are forces that oppose change and one of them is the shareholder's viewpoint. Eccles (2004) maintains that the main impediment for change is that investors are only concerned about financial data, something that we can verify in our professional practice.
Every company must do its homework in the arena of performance measurement.
The design of non-financial performance measures, as well as its follow-up, is by itself hard work. Even harder is the interpretation of measures and its use in tandem with financial measures to fix strategies and manage key human resources activities, such as personnel promotion and incentive granting.
New technologies and database systems make the complementation of financial and non-financial measures possible. Elsewhere (Yacuzzi (2005)) we have proposed the following steps for system implementation.
(1) Development of an information architecture; (2) development of an incentive system; and (3) implementation of a system to insure the functioning of information and incentive systems.
II.4 Performance measurement at SMEs
Benchmarking concepts have multiple applications in performance measurement. With minor adaptations, methods developed for large firms can be used in SMEs as well. Thor's methods have been applied to SMEs in Argentina.
III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS MEASUREMENT, WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO SMALL FIRMS
III.1 Governance as a general concept
Governance is a general concept. Corporate governance, our core interest in this paper, is thus a subset of the general concept; other subsets are public governance and global governance ). In general, it is understood by governance a "field of learning and practice whose main tasks are:
• The search of principles, rules and good practices that allow organizations to be efficiently run within the current institutions, at a certain date; claim that corporate governance has to broaden its focus on the listed corporation, and reach other organizational forms, such as the associations, that they study.
III.2 Corporate governance
We focus now on the business corporation. Table 3 .
III.3 Theories On Corporate Governance
Governance issues are receiving much attention around the world. Dore (2002) , from an international perspective, and Apreda (2001) , from the perspective of Argentina, are two examples of studies about a topic that grows in importance. offer a survey on corporate governance (today outdated but much quoted). Prowse (1995) presents different control mechanisms used by different firms in different countries. Clarke 
III.3.2 Stewardship theory
While agency theory is based upon un underlying model that assumes an individualistic actor that rationally maximizes his own personal gain, stewardship theory is built upon other views of man. Non-financial motivators do exist: people are motivated by the need to achieve, to be recognized by bosses and pairs, to exercise authority and responsibility, and to gain satisfaction through the performance of duties (Donaldson et al. (1991) ).
Under stewardship theory, management does not behave opportunistically, but rather wants to do a good job; there is no need for extrinsic incentives. The organization just has to create structures to facilitate clarification of role expectations and provide the necessary authority and empowerment to managers. Donaldson et al. (1991) 
III.3.3 Resource Based Theory (RBT)
Resource Based Theory (RBT) is a dominant approach to business strategy, based on the concept of economic rent. For RBT the firm is a collection of capabilities. Unlike traditional strategy models, which focus on the company's external competitive environment and tend to ignore its internal workings and resources, RBT emphasizes the need for a fit between the external environment of a company and its internal capabilities.
RBT is grounded in the idea that a firm's internal environment, including its resources and capabilities, is more critical to the determination of strategic decision making than is the external environment, and a firm's unique resources and capabilities provide the basis for a strategy that thoroughly exploits its core competencies relative to opportunities in the 2004) provide criticism.
III.4 Governance of SMEs
Governance of SMEs has special characteristics and problems. SMEs can be characterized by the following traits: Lack of material, financial and human resources, which impinges upon their bargaining power with customers, suppliers and financial institutions; limited managerial resources, including the time that management can devote to non routine activities; less qualified personnel than in larger companies; lack of strategic vision and long-range planning horizons; old ways to organize work; lack of training policies; scant information on markets and technologies; lack of innovation capacity. In spite of the importance of governance to the development of a market economy and the promotion of growth, SMEs are likely in a disadvantageous situation to secure the resources required and develop a corporate governance structure.
Conceptual frameworks built for the understanding and improvement in governance of large, publicly-owned enterprises have to be adapted when applied to SMEs.
There are clear differences between larger and smaller firms, for instance in the amount of resources at hand and in the relationship among owners and managers. A promising avenue directly relevant to the application of governance concepts to smaller firms is that proposed economies that is applicable to SMEs in transition economies?" The author provides some recommendations, including: the need to consider the actors involved en the design of a governance system, as well as the context for which the system is designed; the need to study board working style and characteristics of board members in the design of a governance system; and the need to promote through public education an understanding of good governance principles for SMEs.
One important contingency factor is the country in which a firm operates. Steger (2004) discusses corporate governance of German SMEs and reports that in Germany "aversion to the topic is widespread" among key actors such as SME executives, financial institutions and industry associations; this is true even for academics, who prefer to study large joint-stock companies. Nonetheless, the author recognizes that this aversion is "somewhat bizarre", particularly when the situation of other advanc ed countries is considered. German SMEs play a key role in the German economy: they are equivalent to 84% of all industrial firms, generate 41% of employment and receive 32 % of investment.
A high concentration of ownership and reluctance to attract external capital, including venture capital, is observed. The "aversion" factor includes aversion to "any controlling body inside the firm"; reluctant transparency; and the myth of the "good entrepreneur" who does not need bureaucratic regulation predominates. Steger (2004) anticipates some risks due to this situation in German SMEs: increases in financial difficulties, worsening of the climate between SMEs and financial institutions, decrease of public confidence, increase of problems with top-management succession and increase of economic criminality in the SME sector. On the basis of his study, the author recommends three things: a consensus about the necessity of a broad debate on corporate governance in SMEs among key actors; a wider discussion among academics; the creation of a corporate code for SMEs. This code should be practical, flexible, easy to understand, and should include among its principles:
the transparency of management, a supervisory or advisory board with external members, a planning and risk management system (including internal reporting and cost accounting), a top management succession planning and human resource management.
IV. GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE
IV.1 Relationship between governance and performance in large firms
Empirical findings about the relationship between governance and performance in has an important influence on performance. They conduct a study involving Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, three countries with different governance systems.
Governance characteristics that are common to all countries, as well as country-specific characteristics, are included. Among other findings, it is suggested that country-specific characteristics have an influence on performance. Using the impact of over twenty provisions, depicted in Table 5 These authors also found that closely held ownership is not a barrier to productivity, and that as the number of directors increases, so does productivity. Likewise, non-executive directors on the board contribute to increased productivity. There is some evidence that human capital is key to productivity in small firms. In particular, relationships between a board of directors, the management layer and workers play an important role in increasing productivity in small firms, a role more important than capital increases. Cowling (2003) reports positive and significant effects from the company founder, the board and the management.
There are contributions from different cultural and political settings. Liang and Li (1999) , based on a sample 228 small private firms in Shanghai, China, study the relationship between board structure and firm performance. They find that the presence of outside directors is positively associated with higher return on investment, although most of the firms display a board dominated by people internal to the organization. In addition, duality of titles does not affect firm performance, while higher technology tends to enhance firm performance. On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, Chhaochharia et al. (2004) measured the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and new corporate governance listing standards adopted by the NYSE and Nasdaq, rules adopted following corporate scandals.
Among other findings, the authors report that "small firms that need to make large r governance changes have lower returns, suggesting that the costs of implementing the rules might be larger than their benefits in small firms."
To conclude this preliminary review, we mention two studies. Bellalah (2004) reports a study of more than 60 French firms. Value creation in small firms, the study concludes, is explained by the same factors than large firms. Finally, Zafft (2002) highlights three challenges family-owned firms must cope with: growth, diversification and succession; the three challenges become harder when governance is poor, and better governance helps to improve the corporate functions and family welfare.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This primer reports on corporate governance, corporate performance, and their mutual relationships and measurement systems. Emphasis is placed on the application of these issues to the study of SMEs, with the aim of filling a gap in the literature and research activities. Several important topics converge in our endeavors, including the search for nonfinancial performance measures as a complement to traditional financial measures and the application of corporate governance concepts to SMEs. Key to the improvement of SME management and strategy is the design of a performance management systems that allows the board of directors the implementation and monitoring of sound governance systems.
This document is a first step in that direction.
